

FDS/West  
Aerody

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MGR-W-9329

Chief of Station, Karlsruhe  
Attn: MOB  
Acting Chief, Foreign Division S  
Chief, Foreign Division M  
Operational/REDBIRD

15 June 1951

Weather over AERODYNAMIC Target Area

Ref: MUNI 3555

1. In order to compare the unfavorable weather estimate mentioned in reference with the actual weather over our target area on the night of 14-15 May 1951, we requested that JAYHAWK debrief its aircrews on the weather they encountered en route and at the target area. JAYHAWK's reply was as follows:

- a. Over the target area: broken medium cloud, base 9000 with occasional scattered low clouds giving showers. Visibility for most part good. At surface level light westerly winds of less than 10 knots. Icing index mainly low.
- b. En route: Light, variable, westerly winds from 15 to 20 knots. From 9000 to 16,000 feet considerable medium and high clouds as far as the Danube River with occasional thunderstorms. The plane flew on instruments for this part of the route. North of the Danube, high clouds and medium clouds cleared to approximately 5/8's at 8000 to 10,000 feet. Thus the crew was able to navigate by astro and map readings. Icing index high and visibility good.

2. We will be interested to know here in Washington how this weather report compares with USAFE's weather predictions. The undersigned recalls that a member of Gen. Lewis's staff once stated that he thought Gen. Lewis overdemanding to predicate flying a mission on ideal weather conditions within a limited moon period. This officer added that he personally thought that good visibility at the home field and at the target area with poor visibility and clouds up to 11,500 feet in between would be the ideal weather situation for missions over Soviet-held territory.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

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Project AERODYNAMIC Notes

Disc 2d  
with OPC on  
11 July 1951

1. Future Implementation of CASSOWARY 2:

In view of the factors listed below, it is not a question of whether CASSOWARY 2 should be re-included in the operation, but how:

- a. CASSOWARY 3 has insisted that CASSOWARY 2 be included in all important operational policy decisions;
- b. CASSOWARY 3 and 4 put up a fervent plea in Munich on 2 May that the Washington case officer do everything in his power to settle the misunderstanding which had developed with CASSOWARY 2 over the lie-detector incident.
- c. CASSOWARY 2 is still the Foreign Secretary of the UHVR and as such must participate in all important matters concerning the collaboration of the UHVR and the United States Government.
- d. As the best-known member of the ZPUHVR, CASSOWARY 2 will in all probability continue to be the obvious representative of the ZPUHVR in any United Front organizations which the ZPUHVR joins and will be the U. S. representative which all other Ukrainian groups approach in negotiations with the UHVR or ZPUHVR.
- e. CASSOWARY 2 is one of our best sources of information on events in the Ukrainian emigration.
- f. CASSOWARY 2 will undoubtedly be given special assignments by his parent organization.
- g. There is no difference in opinions between CASSOWARY 2 or 3 nor has one been substantially easier to deal with than the other. CASSOWARY 3 is an excellent negotiator and tactician on policy matters but has very little operational acumen or interest.


CASSOWARY 2 is a negotiator of better than average skill, but is not in the same class as CASSOWARY 3. On the other hand he has a good feeling for operations and has offered to date some of the soundest suggestions used <sup>in</sup> the operation. It would be a mistake to dispense with his advice, although it would be equally wrong to have him govern from New York the manner in which operations are run from Germany.

- h. CASSOWARY 2 has gone squarely on record as not wishing to be informed of the crucial operational details such as date and place of drop, cipher and radio instructions, details concerning the flight plan and air crew. The operational aspects over which he will retain a degree of control are roughly as follows: composition of the parachute team, policy briefing carried by the team, W/T policy messages sent by the ZPUHVR to the UHVR, the relationship of the ZPUHVR to the U. S. Government, the debriefing of couriers arriving from the Ukraine. (It will be remembered that CARTHAGE 3 was franker with CASSOWARY 2 than with either CASSOWARY 3 or his American case officers.)
- i. Since CASSOWARY 2 is the political figurehead of the ZPUHVR, it is a mistake to have no liaison with him and therefore no advance notice of what he plans to do. In the past he has usually told us of his plans and who from other Ukrainian groups or foreign governments have approached the ZPUHVR and with what proposals.
- j. If we are backing the ZPUHVR politically, we are per force backing its main political personality CASSOWARY 2.

3. The Release of W/T Messages to CASSOWARY 2:

Since CASSOWARY 2 and 3 have been full and equal operational partners to date, we can reasonably assume that anything released to CASSOWARY 3 will be transmitted by mail (over which we still have no control) to CASSOWARY 2. We should ask the field to discuss with CASSOWARY 3 the categories of messages which should be released to CASSOWARY 2 and how they should be released. It is a cinch that CASSOWARY 3 will insist that the Washington case officer release all messages to CASSOWARY 2. Whatever reasons we offer for withholding messages from CASSOWARY 2 which are released to CASSOWARY 3 will be misunderstood as discrimination against CASSOWARY 2. Nevertheless, the same general agreement should be worked out with CASSOWARY 3 so that ~~the distribution of~~ cables on operational details will receive a minimum distribution.

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2. Action Recommended:

I. Before re-contacting CASSOWARY 2:

- a. elaboration of a new favorable item of policy which can be told CASSOWARY 2 by the Deputy Director for Plans;
- b. elaboration of an apology to CASSOWARY 2 which can be presented by the Deputy Director for Plans;
- c. initiation of approval for the publication of an English language bulletin in Munich;
- d. discussion of the whole guerrilla warfare program from the point of view:
  - i. where is the most logical place for the training to be given
  - ii. what training staff and interpreters are available
  - iii. what can be accomplished in 1951
- e. discussion with the Defense Department concerning the availability of ZPUHVR Misia UPA men already drafted or subject to draft.

II. Re-contacting CASSOWARY 2:

- a. whether the invitation to CASSOWARY 2 to come to Washington should be delivered through CASSOWARY 15 or via a phone call from
- b. conference in Washington: with the Deputy Director for Plans alone or with others in attendance also?

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c. conference with case officers:

- i. guerrilla warfare training program: willingness to instruct Maj. ~~BAIDA~~ to head this program; availability of candidates; instructions from the Misia UPA to the candidates; our general plan of instruction; BAIDA's biography
- ii. English language bulletin in Munich
- iii. general operational developments.

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